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A Secular Age fell into my lap at a fortuitous moment in the preparation of my doctoral 
research. I had been hunting for a theoretical framework within which to articulate an 
opposition between two groups of modern Muslim writers. On the one hand I had been 
looking at a group of reformists, influenced by Henri Bergson and incorporating various 
mystical and evolutionary ideas; they were distant relatives, you might say, of Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin. On the other hand, there was a group of Sufis as radically opposed to 
the modern world as one could hope to be. Theirs is a neo-Platonic articulation of Islam 
(although they wouldn’t put it like that) which underpins a theory of the “transcendent 
unity of religions”, the view that all religions are one in their esoteric core. It was not hard, I 
thought, to see that these two versions of Islam were poles apart. Yet, surprisingly, the 
radical difference between them was not so apparent to secular scholars in the field. How, I 
wondered, might I be able to construct some simple theoretical framework which might 
make this opposition clear? 
As I read Charles Taylor’s great tome, it dawned on me that his methodological apparatus 
provided the categories I needed. In particular, I homed in on two notions; the social 
imaginary and the “immanent frame”. Taylor’s analytical focus on the social imaginary is 
what sets him apart from other philosophical or sociological accounts of the advent of the 
secular. Rather than focus on avowed religious belief or on the institutional presence of 
religion in society, he concentrates on something that is a condition for belief or unbelief: 
that shared background representation of reality whose shifting contours can be delineated 
by examining the trajectory of our civilisation’s intellectual, institutional and cultural 
development. The long and complex historical narrative which Taylor weaves tells the story 
of a how we westerners moved from an imaginary in which the self’s participation in a 
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transcendent reality is patently obvious to one in which the self is experienced as 
encompassed in an immanent frame, all her ends and aspirations potentially satisfied in this 
world and in this life.  
I work in the area of relations between Christians and Muslims. At the theological level that 
relationship is complex enough. But to understand many of the issues which crop up in 
current dialogue between the two religions entails a detour through their somewhat 
different appropriation of modernity. I have found Taylor’s work yields powerful insights 
into that difference. More than that, I find that it sheds light on my own quest to be faithful 
to the Catholic tradition in the modern age. In the rest of this short paper, I want to explain 
why. 
I want to concentrate on what Taylor calls the “buffered self”. His assertion is that one of 
the fundamental conditions of the kind of spontaneous religious belief which was almost 
universal say five hundred years ago, is a certain sense of selfhood. What makes religious 
belief so problematic today is that this sense of selfhood is no longer easily accessible to us. 
We have passed from an apprehension of the self which Taylor calls porous (though I have 
come to the conclusion that it would be better to speak of the permeable self) to the 
“buffered self”, a sense we all have that “things cannot get to us”, where “things” might be 
evil spirits but also the unwelcome expectations of community and family. Where the 
permeable self feels vulnerable because it is easily invaded, the buffered self is defended by 
a separating membrane and hence is its own master, the centre of its own world. The price 
it pays for its security, however, is that it feels like an observer in the world, detached and 
isolated.  
It is this idea of the modern self as boundaried which offers precious insights into 
contemporary relations between Muslims and Christians. If a great deal of what passes for 
difference between the two religions is, in reality, the consequence of a differential 
appropriation of modernity then it can be analysed in terms of differential selfhood. Some 
examples will come to mind instantly: for the most part, first generation immigrant Muslims 
in Europe betray none of the coyness of their European Christian counterparts in 
recognising the existence (and fearing the very real activities) of bad spirits, jinn. Indeed, a 
naïve realism about the existence of such entities is very much the norm in British Muslim 
communities.  
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But other less obvious themes can also be illuminated by reference to differential selfhood, 
an example being the neuralgic topic of veiling. For modern westerners, the wearing of the 
hijab grates against the passionate conviction embedded in buffered culture that selves, 
including male selves, should be in command of their passions, no matter the intensity of 
the stimulus which might provoke them. Furthermore, no other self should feel obliged to 
modify their behaviour to help their co-citizens resist their darker impulses. For permeable 
selves, the situation would look very different. It is common sense that selves, especially 
male selves, are not fully in control of ourselves. They can be visited with devastating impact 
by powerful and destructive forces, not least sexual temptation. It is only prudent that one 
take certain precautions to avoid calamity. Now, in our public debate, the issue is usually 
moral charged on both sides: for one side, it’s a simple standoff between modesty and 
licence; for the other it is about the right of an individual to self-expression and the duty of 
the other to self-control. Taylor’s analysis enables us to see that it is not just a matter of two 
incommensurable moral claims. Something deeper is at work: profoundly different senses of 
selfhood. On each side are people who sense their very selfhood to be under threat. It’s not 
a moral disagreement so much as an ontological one. This explains why such a simple, 
practical matter has taken on an almost totemic significance.  
British society is not simply divided between “buffered” Christians and “permeable” 
Muslims. Alongside a growing number of “permeable” Christians from Africa and elsewhere, 
Britain is also home to growing numbers of “buffered” Muslims, youngsters born and 
brought up in the West and finding themselves living out their faith in a way very different 
to their parents. Taylor’s categories offer a much-needed framework to explore these 
crucial inter-generational transitions. For example, one important phenomenon, hardly 
confined to Muslims, is that of the buffered self who talks like a permeable self. Many 
Catholics, I find, speak about their faith with a lack of sophistication quite at odds with the 
level of their general education and the sophistication of their professional lives. They are 
fully buffered selves who, when it comes to matters religious, reproduce the discourse of 
permeable selves, their discourse suggesting a naïve realism about the supernatural but co-
opted into the service of the isolated individual, her wants and sensed needs. If I may be 
bold, one finds this replicated in the religious discourse of neo-conservatives, 
fundamentalists and, of course, jihadi militants. Perhaps the phenomenon can even account 
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for our media’s systematically incoherent and distorted treatment of religion; all that 
buffered journalists can do, faced with the madness of religion, is to mouth what they have 
heard, a language handed down from a traditional milieu, saturated as it is with the 
experience of permeable selves.  
The Iranian intellectual Dariush Shayegan speaks of “cultural schizophrenia”. I think Taylor’s 
model gives us greater clarity than Shayegan’s evocation of a split self, about what is really 
at stake: in any individual there is just one actually functioning imaginary which acts as the 
substrate on which everything else is built. If a person’s discourse is at odds with the 
contents of their imaginary then everything is distorted. What they say will simply not ring 
true. If I may venture a bold hypothesis, it seems to me that much of what is usually 
discussed today under the heading of “fundamentalism” is in fact best analysed as the 
consequence of a disjunction between a religious language which comes from a world of 
permeable selves and the instrumentalist mentality of the buffered identity which has made 
it his own. It is noticeable, for example, that the milieu of Islamism is dominated by those 
with a background not in religious law but the natural sciences. Treating sacred texts as if 
they were scientific manuals is exactly the kind of clash I am talking about.  
Although one might be inclined to think that buffering is the preserve of Protestantism 
within the Christian world, Taylor argues that in fact it has its origins in the Catholic pastoral 
programme engendered at the time of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215). He identifies the 
seminal impulse of modernity in those reiterated pushes for “reform” which are to be found 
among both Catholics and Protestants, in fact in any proposal that the lives of all the faithful 
should reflect the highest demands of the Gospel, whether it come from the Reformers or 
the Counter-Reformers.  
This is importantly counter-intuitive. Catholics like to think of themselves as quaintly 
medieval. We adopt rather too easily the role of patrician resistance to the modern world. 
The typically pessimistic pronouncements of the Magisterium make clear that we see 
ourselves as bastions of communion and defenders of the dignity of the person against a 
modern, globalised culture that is ever more individualistic and fragmented. There is, of 
course, truth in this. But what is left out of this picture is the extent to which a modern 
Catholic identity is also highly buffered in its own way, not least by virtue of the tight rein by 
which the Church enforces doctrinal uniformity. The Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
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Faith and its predecessors have been, thanks to the disciplinary role they have exercised 
over centuries, among the most effective buffering agents of our civilisation. This sheds light 
on what can be a fundamental incoherence in some Catholic diagnoses of what is wrong 
with the contemporary world. One cannot both attack the consequences of buffering (e.g. 
fragmentation, individualism, etc.) and prescribe yet more buffering as the cure (e.g. stricter 
adherence to moral or liturgical rules).  And it is not just a problem of incoherence. It is the 
predicament of the buffered self which makes access to a genuinely religious experience so 
problematic’ you cannot “let God in” if you do not experience anything very much as 
“getting in”. If the Church’s current practices and disciplines do not always help in this 
matter, how might they? 
Taylor believes that there is a way of overcoming the limitations of the buffered self and of 
exiting the immanent frame. The intuition is fleshed out in the final (and, I suspect the least 
read and the least understood) chapter of A Secular Age, “Conversions”. In those pages, 
Taylor sketches the itineraries of three modern “converts” (all to Catholicism) who, by his 
reckoning, each found a route to something beyond the default social imaginary which 
defines the age.  
 For Charles Péguy, it was through the realisation that the great founding moments 
of his past could not be treated as mere objects: the legacy of the French Revolution 
could not be lived out as if it were starkly opposed to that of France’s medieval, 
Christian past. The two historical moments should infuse each other; they were both 
matters in which he was profoundly and formatively involved. (Donald Allchin has 
spoken evocatively of “an ecumenism of the past” to express a similar idea.) 
 For Ivan Illich, maverick critic of even the positive aspects of modernity, it was an 
awareness of how the dawn of Christianity had been accompanied, almost from the 
outset, by a pull towards rules and regulations, which enabled him to access an 
essentially pre-modern sense. The Gospel, which according to Illich is intrinsically 
characterised by an ethos of interpersonal encounter and culturally transgressive 
friendship, has always been in danger of giving way to the mere moral imperative to 
provide forms of social care to the needy on a universal and, therefore, routinely 
institutionalised basis.  
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 Finally, for Gerard Manley Hopkins, it was the discovery of language’s capacity to 
make new meanings, to give form to a meaning which is in the very process of being 
born into consciousness, which led him beyond our modern sense that the lot of 
words is simply to correspond to an objective truth about the state of the world. 
These three itineraries of conversion are not exhaustive, nor are they meant to be. What 
they all have in common is a deep-seated disenchantment with modernity which, as we 
know so well, could have catapulted them into a rigidly reactionary anti-modern, even 
restorationist stance. What saved them from this was that what they experienced was 
disenchantment with the mood and ways of the buffered identity itself. They seem to have 
stumbled upon a way to dissolve the hermetic seal which so isolates the buffered self, 
ushering in new modes of connectedness. It is no coincidence that Taylor ends his book with 
a paean to communion. According to his analysis, it is only by re-discovering various forms 
of mutual ontological participation that we can hope to find a way out of the more stifling 
and sterile effects of immanence-confined life.  
Coming at all this with an interest in the mission of the Church in Europe, I detect here the 
seed of a pastoral programme. Helping people to find a way out of the immanent frame and 
into an experience of God and of themselves which challenges the boundaries of the 
immanentist imaginary strikes me as being exactly what, at our best, we Jesuits find 
ourselves doing when we give the Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius Loyola (a text Taylor 
mentions several times in A Secular Age). Ignatius, it seems to me, sits on the cusp between 
permeable and buffered selfhood. He comes to the spiritual quest with all the 
appurtenances of the ascetic hero, determined to discipline himself to the point where he 
can better the examples of Saints Dominic and Francis. An early prayer of his (“Teach us, 
good Lord, to serve you as you deserve; to give and not to count the cost; to fight and not to 
heed the wounds; to toil and not to seek for rest; to labour and not to ask for any reward, 
save that of knowing that we do your will.”) has a somewhat buffered feel to it. But come 
his crucial conversion experience, Ignatius finds a way out via, and this is crucial, the 
personal discovery of a new way of knowing: the discernment of spirits. In the Exercises, 
Ignatius spells out that the aim of spiritual discernment is to recognise “the different 
movements which are caused in the soul, the good to receive them, the bad to reject them”. 
These simple words summarise a dramatic step forward emblematic of his conversion 
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experience. Notice the profound change which has taken place in the sense of selfhood 
expressed. The buffered self, we know, does not sense itself vulnerable to the movement of 
spirits. It is strictly impermeable. The permeable self, on the other hand, is vulnerable to the 
point of not being able to do anything about the action of the spirits; this is, after all, what 
gives the witch doctor his power. So the idea that one can recognise the movements of the 
spirits and then act to accept or reject them is a challenge to both imaginaries. It is the birth 
of a new kind of self. This, I take it, is what marks out the quality of that prayer of the 
mature Ignatius, the Suscipe (“Take, Lord, and receive all my liberty, my memory, my 
understanding, and my entire will, all I have and call my own. You have given all to me. To 
you, Lord, I return it. Everything is yours; do with it what you will. Give me only your love 
and your grace, that is enough for me.”) It is, to put it simply, not all about the one praying 
but about a transfigured identity in which the one praying is conscious of living in deep 
communion with God. Perhaps the word “person” best captures the essence of it. 
The significance of these observations, inspired by Taylor’s ideas, should not be ignored 
when it comes to thinking through the Church’s pastoral response to the modern world. 
Two strident voices within (and without) the Church have until recently dominated the 
discussion. Contemporary Church discourse has taken on an unpleasantly polemical and 
discordant tone, echoing the “culture wars” of the North American political scene with its 
polarisation between liberals and conservatives. Both “sides” have found it hard to place a 
Jesuit Pope who seems not quite to fit into either camp. Is it possible that Pope Francis is 
rather like Taylor’s converts? Has he found a path beyond the disciplined buffered identity 
in whose tight grip both sides in the polemic are still held? If so, I predict that this 
pontificate will become more and not less mystifying to people as it proceeds. Papa 
Bergoglio beckons to us with his characteristic thumbs-up from a world most of us simply 
cannot locate, beholden as we are to the prison-bars of the immanent frame. It is a world 
invariably accessed through crisis and disenchantment but one which opens up the self to 
communion by allowing God to get to us. I am indebted to Charles Taylor for helping me to 
understand this (even if he doesn’t agree with it!) and I commend him to you as a uniquely 
wise and perceptive guide to complex times. 
 
